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Notwithstanding disclaimers, one must live with what he writes.
Thus, a short piece which merely attempts to set forth reactions carries
a considerable risk. For the sake of form, this disclaimer should be included: no effort is made here to explore the topic in traditional scholarly fashion. The premise (which the reader may choose to reject) is
that the author is capable of such "traditional" scholarship. What follows are some reactions to Mendel v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co.1
The problem in Mendel is well-known. It has been presented to
other courts and it is a problem which law students may have been
forced to consider in courses such as Commercial Transactions or even
Torts. One short answer to it is that any court confronted with the necessity of deciding the theoretical basis for personal injury caused by
a defective product should choose a tort theory such as that set forth
in the Restatement of Torts. 2 The cause of action would then accrue
at the time of the injury and a typically short period (two or three
years) would then begin to run. Whether the injured plaintiff is a buyer
of the product, someone in the buyer's household, a guest in his home,
or a consumer who purchased from the retail-buyer, should be irrelevant. There was no cause of action before the personal injury occurred,
and the cause of action which began its existence at the time of the injury should be characterized as a tort because it has all of the elements
of tort and none of the elements of contract in relation to a plaintiff
such as Cecile Mendel. If the plaintiff happens to be the buyer of the
defective product which causes his personal injury, the contract concept
intermeddles and creates judicial problems, some of which became insuperable obstacles for the majority in Mendel. However, even the
buyer who has sustained a personal injury should bring his action in
tort, i.e., use a strict liability theory in tort. Were this a traditional
piece, appropriate quotes from Justices Traynor and Francis could be
suggested. Hopefully, the reader need not be convinced of this conclusion or the reasons in support of it. The problem in Mendel was
that the majority was simply not convinced.
The reaction could simply end here: the majority should have acProfessor of Law, University of Pittsburgh, School of Law. B.S., LaSalle College,
1955; J.D., Catholic University, 1958; S.J.D., University of Wisconsin, 1959.
125 N.Y.2d 340, 253 N.E2d 207, 205 N.YS.2d 490 (1969).
2 RYsTATEmENT (SECOND) OF Tomvs § 402A (1965).
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cepted section 402A of the Restatement or something akin thereto; it
did not, and consequently, the maze of Uniform Commercial Code
(UCC) construction problems are raised. Once the Code is considered
as the exclusive route to strict liability protection for plaintiffs such as
Cecile Mendel, the construction urged by the majority is plausible, at
least on a "plain-meaning" basis. It is that construction which is so
disappointing. Eventually, the Court of Appeals may simply have to
recognize its error in Mendel and adopt section 402A for many reasons,
including the statute of limitations problem found in the Code. From
that standpoint, the majority may have created a snarl which is reminiscent of the shackles placed on the doctrine of Lawrence v. Fox3 by the
incredibly narrow construction of that doctrine in Vrooman v. Turner,4
thus retarding if not precluding a viable third-party beneficiary theory.
The majority might have benefited from a thorough exploration of the
Pennsylvania situation in relation to product liability. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court created a snarl, attempted to undo it piecemeal
and eventually produced the confrontation opinion resulting in the
emasculation of vertical privity and the adoption of section 402A.;
There is an almost incredible waste of judicial energy in such a process
often creating results which are complex and unjust.
At bottom, the question must be asked: does the UCC preempt
the question of personal injury recovery when the injury is caused by
a defective product? Long before the Code was drafted, there were viable methods available to injured plaintiffs in certain kinds of situations
to procure relief on a strict liability basis. This was particularly true in
the food and beverage cases and became increasingly true in non-food
cases when the product was "inherently" dangerous and, ultimately,
even when it was not. Yet, with all of this development, the implied
warranty theory was a vital part of the arsenal. When the drafters of the
UCC had to decide what to do with product liability, they were willing
3 20 N.Y. 268 (1859).
4 69 N.Y. 280, 25 Am. Rep. 195 (1877). This opinion limited the doctrine of Lawrence
v. Fox to cases involving the same essential facts. Therefore, the only third parties who
could recover were creditor beneficiaries. Since 1877, the New York courts have been at-

tempting to free themselves from this burdensome opinion. Various inroads have been
attempted. See, e.g., Seaver v. Ransom, 224 N.Y. 233, 120 N.E. 639 (1918). See also Lait v.
Leon, 40 Misc. 2d 60, 242 N.Y.S.2d 776 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1963), which suggests that
the remaining shackles are nebulous. However, in Scheidl v. Universal Aviation Equip., Inc.,
159 N.Y.S.2d 278 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk County 1957), the shackles seem real, indeed.
5 See Kassab v. Central Soya, 432 Pa. 217, 246 A.2d 848 (1968). Pennsylvania adopted
section 402A of the Restatement of Torts in Webb v. Zern, 422 Pa. 424, 220 A.2d 853
(1966). Shortly thereafter, it upheld the requirement of vertical privity in Miller v. Preitz,
422 Pa. 383, 221 A.2d 320 (1966). The confrontation and resolution occurred in Kassab.
There is still the question of a further extension of horizontal privity in Pennsylvania.
See Tucker v. Capitol Mach., Inc., 307 F. Supp. 291 (M.D. Pa. 1969).
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to extend the concept of horizontal privity but remained neutral on the
ultimate extension and expressly refused to deal with vertical privity.
The neutrality is dearly expressed as follows:
This section expressly includes as beneficiaries within its provisions
the family, household and guests of the purchaser. Beyond this,
the section is neutral and is not intended to enlarge or restrict
the developing case law on whether the seller's warranties, given
to his buyer who resells, extend to other persons in the distributive
chain.0
The "developing case law" is foundational in the Code. So often,
a Code section will state a principle rather than a rule which requires,
to a greater or lesser extent, case-by-case development. One example
is a disconcerting section, 2-207, which deals with the now famous or infamous "battle of the forms. ' Certainly, the unconscionability standard
set forth in 2-302 is almost totally dependent upon case law development and was designed only to provide the courts with a sufficient basis
for such development.8 Other illustrative sections may be set forth but
are not necessary to the conclusion. How would 2-318 have read (or at
least, what changes in the comments to that section would have occurred) if 402A had been well-established through judicial adoption
at the time the Code was drafted? This is not to suggest that any court
should place itself in the position of a legislature with hindsight knowledge and then proceed in allegedly spurious fashion to construe the
Code as it is now written. Rather, an inquiry as to the purpose of 2-318
and related sections might reveal that the drafters of the UCC (and the
legislators who later enacted it) may not have felt that the ultimate
concept of product liability was intended. There is no difficulty in
construing the Code in terms of its underlying purposes, and assuming
that "underlying" means, at least, that the purposes are not always
dearly expressed, a "plain-meaning" methodology is rejected.
In the oft-forgotten Article, it is clearly stated: "This Act shall be
liberally construed and applied to promote its underlying purposes
and policies." This is a "Rule of Construction" which courts are commanded to use. The application of the rule to the instant situation
suggests that 2-318 was not intended as the ultimate or exclusive law on
products liability; that a court is permitted if not invited to extend
2-318 and, therefore, the adoption of something like 402A is not in
§ 2-318, comment 3.
7 See Murray, Intention Over Terms: An Exploration of UCC 2-207 and New Section
60, Restatement of Contracts, 37 FoanHAm L. REv. 317 (1969).
s See Murray, Unconscionability:Unconscionability, 31 U. Prrr. L. Ray. 1 (1969).
6 UNIFORM COMNERCIAL CODE

9 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §

1-102(l).
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conflict with such purposeful development. Thus, the fundamental
error of the majority in Mendel is the failure to construe the Code as
it must be construed according to the basic rule of construction expressly set forth.
The failure by the majority to pursue "underlying purposes" is
particularly evident in its handling of the specific sections beyond 2-318.
Once it decided that the exclusive strict liability theory was contractual,
the appropriate sections of the UCC had to be applied, albeit analogously, since the Code was not applicable to the controversy before the
Court. Does the Code deal with personal injuries? The answer to this
inquiry is found in 2-715(2)(b) which includes, under consequential
damages, injuries to the person proximately caused by any breach of
warranty. What is the Code statute of limitations? Well, 2-725 could
not be clearer: it is four years from the time a cause of action accrues,
and it accrues when the breach occurs. When does the breach occur?
To the rescue is 2-725(2): "A breach of warranty occurs when tender
of delivery is made." Now, returning to the first sentence of the subsection: "A cause of action accrues when the breach occurs, regardless
of the aggrieved party's lack of knowledge of the breach." Nothing
could be clearer and there is no room for interpretation when the language is clear. The majority does not discuss any other possible interpretation, although, unwittingly, it has interpreted these sections. 10
A manufacturer of air conditioners sells a large shipment to a retailer who keeps some in stock for three years. He finally sells the last
one in sealed carton to a consumer who installs it in his bedroom
window. A year and a day later, the consumer's son is "shocked" when
he turns the operating knob, sustaining permanent disability. The cause
is clearly traced to a manufacturing defect. When did the breach occur?
It occurred upon tender of delivery to the retailer. When did the cause
of action accrue? It accrued when the breach occurred, regardless of the
aggrieved party's lack of knowledge of the breach. Consequently, plaintiff loses in his suit against the manufacturer. Consider another hypothetical with the same fact pattern except that the plaintiff purchases the
conditioner on the day delivery was made to the retailer. On the same
day, he installs the conditioner and his son is "shocked." Three years
and eleven months later, his lawyer commences the action. Assuming
10 It is sometimes said, in a case in which the written words seem plain and clear
and unambiguous, that the words are not subject to interpretation or construction.
One who makes this statement has of necessity already given the words an interpretation -the
one that is to him plain and clear; and in making the statement
he is asserting that any different interpretation is "perverted" and untrue.
Corbin, The Interpretation of Words and the Parol Evidence Rule, 50 CoRuNmu L.Q. 161,
171-72 (1965).
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the usual elements for recovery, plaintiff wins. It is interesting to compare the results in these two situations with the policy reason suggested
by the majority for its conclusion. First, of course, it did not consider
the question to be open. This was because it read the judicial precedent
as relegating the action to breach of warranty. Regardless of the precedent, it read the Code as preempting this area. For the curious, however,
the majority opinion does set forth the following statement of policy:
We are willing to sacrifice the small percentage of meritorious
claims that might arise after the statutory period has run in order
to prevent the many unfounded suits that would be brought and
sustained against manufacturers ad infinitum. Surely an injury
resulting from a defective product many years after it had been
manufactured, presumptively at least, is due to operation and
maintenance.31
It is difficult to believe that the majority of the Court knew exactly what it was sacrificing. There is the suggestion that the majority
does not believe that any theory of product liability is sound. The defect can either be proved or not; the defective condition of a glass door,
air conditioner or any other product may be caused by faulty operation
or maintenance. If the Court is suggesting that the burden on the plaintiff to prove the defect is not sufficient, it can judicially restructure that
burden and, in cases such as Mendel, it could even go so far as to set
forth a rebuttable presumption that the defect was not in the manufacture of the item. Whether this would be desirable is not important;
it is important, however, that the Court did not appreciate the essential
distinction suggested.
Perhaps more than any other deficiency, the majority opinion made
no inquiry at all as to the purposes of the vital section involved, 2-725.
The purposes of 2-725 include uniformity of statutes of limitations for
businesses operating on a nationwide basis and a realistic statutory
period for normal commercial record keeping.' 2 A careful examination
of the statutory language indicates that a "plain-meaning" interpretation could lead to results opposed to the majority's conclusion. The
language of the UCC states: "An action for breach of any contract for
sale must be commenced within four years after the cause of action has
accrued."' 3 Clearly, a plaintiff such as Cecile Mendel is not bringing
an action for the breach of a sales contract. This argument is mitigated
by the critical language which follows: "[a] breach of warranty occurs
1125 N.Y.2d at 346, 253 N.E.2d at 210, 305 N.Y.S.2d
12 UNFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §

181d. § 2-725(1).

2-725, comment.

at 495.
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when tender of delivery is made."' 4 The plaintiff was, inter alia, basing
her cause of action upon a breach of warranty theory. Notwithstanding
this "answer" to the argument that the drafters of the UCC were thinking in commercial contract terms, the section is oriented toward a
genuine breach of contract situation for several other reasons. If a
"cause of action accrues when the breach occurs," it accrues only to the
purchaser regardless of his knowledge of the defect, because the only
legal relationship is a contractual one between buyer and seller and,
therefore, the only breach which can occur goes to that relationship.
Cecile Mendel had no cause of action at this time because there was no
duty owed to her which was breached. Moreover, the cause of action
accrues when the breach occurs, "regardless of the aggrieved party's lack
of knowledge of the breach." Who is an "aggrieved party"? The definition set forth in the Code indicates that an "aggrieved party" is any
party entitled to a remedy.15 There is no elaboration of this "new"
term in the comment to 1-201. Cecile Mendel is not an "aggrieved
party" under the Code definition. Again, the only possible "aggrieved
party" at the time of delivery is the buyer.
If the Code drafters had considered plaintiffs such as Mendel when
structuring 2-725, would it have been changed? It would have been
most helpful if they had indicated in some fashion whether the fouryear period was to run from the time of delivery in relation to third
parties such as the plaintiff. One mode of construction is merely to conclude that since they said nothing, they intended the same period to
apply, regardless of the plaintiff. If the Code is to be interpreted in
this flagellant fashion, there is little hope for it. One only has to point
to the plausible ("plain meaning") argument of Professor Leff which
states that the unconscionability standard of 2-302 does not apply to a
situation wherein the seller has formally complied with the requirements of warranty disclaimers set forth in 2-316.16 The fact that this
construction would undermine the purpose of both 2-816 and 2-302 was
simply not considered; only the language was considered important. In
any event, the drafters of the UCC said nothing about the situation before the Court in relation to the statute of limitations. Did they consider the situation in any other context?
There is an interesting analogous situation wherein the drafters
took upon themselves, at least in two comments, the responsibility of
1lid. § 2-725(2).
15 Id. § 1-201(2).
16 See Leff, Unconscionability and the Code: The Emperor's New Clause, 115 U. PA.
L. RV. 485, 523-24 (1967); see also Murray, supra note 8, at 48-49.
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differentiating buyer-merchants from beneficiaries such as the plaintiff.
Section 2-607(3)(a) deals with the requirement of notice from the purchaser to the seller within a reasonable time after the buyer has or
should have discovered the seller's breach. Absent such notice within
a reasonable time, the buyer is "barred from any remedy." This section
could play havoc with non-buyer beneficiaries under 2-318. If a retailer purchased air conditioners for resale and discovered no defects
upon tender of delivery, he would accept the goods. Assume he sells a
conditioner to a consumer who, a few months later, is "shocked" when
he operates it. The action is brought against the manufacturer and retailer. Inter alia, the defense of 2-607 (3) (a) is presented: the consumerbuyer did not notify the seller or manufacturer of breach within a reasonable time. This is ludicrous and the Code recognizes it as such. In
the first instance," '[a] reasonable time' for notification from a retail
consumer is to be judged by different standards." 17 Furthermore:
Under this article various beneficiaries are given rights for injuries
sustained by them because of the seller's breach of warranty. Such
a beneficiary does not fall within the reason of the present section
in regard to discovery of defects and the giving of notice within a
reasonable time after acceptance, since he has nothing to do with
acceptance.1s
The comment goes on to suggest that some notice is essential but it is
extended in the case of a consumer. The standard is one of good faith.
If comment 5 could be slightly changed it might apply with great force
to 2-725:
Under this article, various beneficiaries are given rights for injuries
sustained by them because of the seller's breach of warranty. Such
a beneficiary does not fall within the reason of the present action
in regard to the time when a cause of action accrues since the beneficiary has no cause of action until injured and is not, therefore, an
aggrieved party until injured.
This fictitious comment would have been in keeping with the policy found in the comments to 2-607 particularly comment 5, its sensibleness being unquestioned. It is absurd to measure a "reasonable time"
from the time the goods are accepted by the purchaser when the breach
of warranty is the basis for a personal injury action by a non-buyer
beneficiary under 2-318. Such a party has "nothing to do with acceptance." In relation to 2-725, such a party has nothing to do with tender
of delivery. Alas, there is no such comment to 2-725. Thus, the answer
17 UmwoRM COMMRCIAL CODE § 2-607, comment 4.

IsId. § 2-607, comment 5.
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supplied by the majority is that we must abide the absurd result it
reached though an analogous absurd result is avoided by the comments
to another section.
Should a court construct fictitious comments or construe the Code
as if they existed? Is this not diametrically opposed to statutory interpretation standards, whether interpreting the Code or some other statute?19 In consideration of these important questions, one must recall that
in a statute, it is imperative to start with the statutory language. The
trouble with the majority opinion is that it ended its exploration with
the language. The statutory language is operative language which leads
to the next question-whether the fact situation before the court fits
nicely within the operative language? What elements are required by
the section? Are all of these elements present in the fact situation? If
we stop and briefly examine the operative language of 2-725, we find,
that the fact situation does not easily meet the requirements. The section demands that there be a breach of warranty and, when there is
such a breach, a cause of action accrues regardless of the aggrieved
party's lack of knowledge of the breach. Finally, the breach occurs when
tender of delivery is made. Thus, we must have a breach to have a cause
of action, and, apparently, there must be an aggrieved party. A reasonable reading (though certainly not the only one) suggests that we have
none of these operative elements. At the very least, they are not easily
found. It now becomes necessary to search through the Code for some
other section which is applicable. Unfortunately, there is none. Now
that we have found that the only section that seems to treat our fact
situation is one where our situation does not easily fit, should it be
applied though our situation is longer and wider (or shorter and
narrower) than the section? The simple answer is the negative maxim:
if the shoe does not fit, don't wear it. The rule should not be used. How
do we decide how bad a fit the section is? We look to the reason for
the rule and in this process, we consider other sections, analogous sections. A section of the Code does not stand alone. We have considered
an analogous section (2-607) and found that the drafters intended a result therein which is opposed to the construction of 2-725 urged by the
majority. We have also carefully considered 2-318 and the fact that the
drafters expressly foresaw the possibility, if not probability, of significant case law development beyond anything found in that section. Add
these explorations to the fact that the operative elements of 2-725 are
not clearly present in our fact situation and the inescapable conclusion
19 It is probably desirable to confess that the author agrees with those who suggest
that the Code is not a genuine Code but rather a group of statutes.
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seems to be that 2-725 should not be applied in the present situation.
The incredible fact is that the majority (at least in terms of the opinion
by Judge Scileppi), did not even deign to consider these possibilities.
The kind of Code construction in the majority opinion creates
serious obstacles for the future. It cannot be gainsaid that the Code
represents a substantial improvement over its antecedents. However, it
is not simply a series of amendments to the Uniform Sales Act, the
Negotiable Instruments Law, and statutes designed to protect the secured creditor. It is an attempt to provide a totally new legal structure
for commercial situations. This is not to suggest that all of the past
is to be ignored. In fact, prior legal and equitable principles are incorporated to supplement the Code provisions. 20 But, the Code is a
new statutory departure, and it is filled with Llewellynesque leeways.
The pervasive concepts of commercial reasonableness and good faith as
well as the generality of many provisions, particularly those in Article
2, require courts to approach the application of this new set of statutes
with a different focus. The focus must be creative and imaginative and
it must be concerned with purposes. It requires lawyers and courts to
consider all of the surrounding circumstances all of the time. Thus, the
advocates and their judges will have to engage in a great deal of empirical verification beyond that which they considered in the past. This is
further mandated by the revolutionary developments in the agreement
process which suggests, inter alia, that intention must prevail over form.
Moreover, the sleeping giant of unconscionability requires this. The
sections dealing with the parol evidence rule, 2 1 the emasculation of the
preexisting duty rule,22 assignment and delegation, 23 the open price
term, 24 and the output-requirements contract, 25 to name a few others,
move in the same direction. This is why it was so important for the
majority to consider the purposes of the relevant sections before it in
Mendel. Section 2-318 is intended as nothing more than an effort to set
forth a basis for strict liability under the implied warranty mantle. The
drafters could not have been more clear in this regard, though one must
rely upon the unenacted comments to reach this construction. With
the movement, the change, the requirement of creativity and imagination elsewhere, did the drafters intend to slam the door on parties such
as Cecile Mendel under 2-725? If the response is: why didn't they say
20 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-103.
21 Id. § 2-202.
22 Id. § 2-209.

23 Id. § 2-210.
24 Id. § 2-305
25 Id. § 2-30a
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something different about such plaintiffs? The answer must be: no
statute anywhere at anytime said everything.
The ultimate disappointment suggested by the majority opinion
in Mendel is not its refusal to adopt 402A or something akin thereto.
Certainly, this failure is significant, and, had the Court gone the 402A
route, the case would have simply added to the increasing number of
jurisdictions so doing. Having failed in this, the Court then shifted to
Code gear and effected a bungling construction which must be unsnarled. The performance by the majority is, unfortunately, not unusual. Karl Llewellyn and his friends have presented one of the most
significant challenges to courts in the history of American law. That
challenge, in some situations, can be met only by the artistry of Cardozo
and the precision of Brandeis. In deciding Mendel, the majority of the
New York Court of Appeals was simply not blessed with such attributes.

